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I. INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1999, eighteen-year-old Shawn Fanning introduced Napster,
a new peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing software platform, onto the intemet.' In that
moment, the business paradigm that had driven the modem music industry since
the early twentieth century was forever changed. No longer could musicians and
record label executives rely on controlling the manufacture and sale of physical
recordings to generate revenue. Instead, since 1999 the music-consuming public
has increasingly desired digital music,2 and most have wanted it for free.3
Future of Music Coalition (FMC) is an organization launched around the same
time as Napster. Since 2000, FMC has provided a voice in Washington, D.C. for
musicians. One of our principal beliefs is that creation, both artistic and
technological, is valuable and that artists deserve to be compensated for their
work. The amount of this compensation and the mechanisms to facilitate
payment are, of course, subject to contracts, market value, and other factors, some
experimental or technological in nature. FMC also believes that music fans should
be able to lawfully access the music they want without undue barriers or
restrictions. Needless to say, finding the appropriate balance between creators'
rights and public benefit in the digital age has been challenging. Yet, it's a
discussion that must continue, and FMC is committed to facilitating these
important conversations.
In 2000, FMC took the position that the only antidote to an illegal Napster is
a legal Napster.4 The events of the last decade have demonstrated this statement's
truth. Terrestrial music sales have dropped, and digital sales have risen.5

I GREG KOT, RIPPED: HOW THE WIRED GENERATION REVOLUTIONIZED MUSIC 25
(Scribner 2009).
2 PricewaterhouseCoopers, Digital Migration Leaves No Hiding Place in 2013, in GLOBAL
ENTERTAINMENT AND MEDIA OuTLooK: 2009-2013, at 1 (2009), availabk at http://www.pwc.
com/enGX/gx/gobal-entertainment-media-outlook/pdf/hiding-place.pdf (showing that digital
spending will jump from 21% in 2008 to 31% by 2013, and that digital spending will be the
entertainment and media industry's main engine of growth).
3 InternetPiraq:Thanks, Me Hearties,ECONOMISTJuly 17th, 2008, at 87, availableathttp://www.
economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story-jd=117 5 103 5 ("For every song that is bought
legally, in shops or online, around 20 songs are illegally downloaded ... .
' Michael Bracy, Policy Director, Future of Music Coalition, Presentation at the FTC Forum
on Peer-to-Peer Filesharing (Dec. 16,2004) (transcript available at http://futureofmusic.org/filing/
fmcs-presentation-ftc-forum-peer-peer-filesharing).

5

PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, THE STATE OF MUSIC ONLINE: TEN YEARS
AFTER NAPSTER 7-8 (2009), http://www.pewintemet.org/Reports/2009/9-The-State-of-Music-

Online-Ten-Years-After-Napster.aspx.
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Although digital sales have not increased enough to make up for falling physical
album sales,6 it is increasingly clear that the future of music distribution is online.
Since 2000, numerous new music business models have attempted to monetize
music in the new digital marketplace. A few have succeeded, but many have
failed. Some failures could be blamed on poorly constructed schemes. However,
some workable business models have struggled not because their model is
unworkable, but because of the law's inability to adapt to the intemet age.
Tensions between existing copyright law and current consumptive
trends-facilitated by technological developments that were unimaginable even
ten years ago-are hampering the effort to build new business models that
compensate artists, meet consumer demand, and create an economically
sustainable cultural community. Much of the problem stems from the lack of a
stable legal framework governing the digital use of creative content.
This Article will highlight some unresolved legal tensions surrounding the
creation of new, viable digital music business models, effective artist
compensation, and maximum public benefit. We believe Congress and the new
administration should address these tensions in order to encourage the creation
of a vibrant, viable digital music marketplace.
Part II will provide background on the purpose of the Copyright Act and
examine its relationship to digital technologies.
Part III will outline the licensing issues facing those who attempt to create
legitimate, lawful digital distribution models. The current licensing system
engenders unacceptably high transaction costs. Moreover, copyright owners
sometimes request outlandishly high royalty rates. These costs create barriers to
innovation and entry into the market. Licensing reform is needed to lower
transaction and overhead costs and give digital businesses greater economic
flexibility.
Part IV will demonstrate the need for network neutrality and highlight some
potential pitfalls that could hamper independent distribution and fair use rights.
Tiered pricing schemes for content delivery would damage an independent digital
music business' ability to compete with entrenched corporate interests.
Additionally, failure to implement network neutrality principles may inadvertently
allow incumbent telecommunications providers to control the fair use of
copyrighted music.
Part V concludes the Article and sets forth FMC's recommended potential best
practices for a way forward on these complex issues. The new administration in
Washington has an opportunity to address these tensions through carefully
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considered policy, but it must do so with certain principles in mind in order to be
effective.
PART I

The Copyright Act's (the Act) purpose is to encourage a vibrant, accessible
public culture, as well as incentivize artists to create, and reward them for their
work. It achieves these twin goals by giving creators a limited monopoly over
their works, and then releasing those works into the public domain.' The artists'
monopoly was originally composed of five specific rights: the rights to distribute,
reproduce, create derivative works, publicly perform, and publicly display their
creations. 9
Attempts have been made to adjust copyright law in response to digital
technologies. The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995
(DPRSRA) amended the Act and added a sixth exclusive right-a public
performance right for "digital audio transmissions" of sound recordings.' ° Prior
to the DPRSRA, sound recording copyright owners did not have the right to
receive public performance royalties for broadcasts of their work. The DPRSRA
gave them this right, albeit restricting it to digital broadcasts."
Three years later, Congress made another change to the Copyright Act. In
response to fears about increasing digital piracy, it passed the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA). The DMCA sanctioned content restrictions by
criminalizing the act of circumventing Digital Rights Management Technology

' Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The limited scope of
the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration required by the
Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to
be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting
broad public availability of literature, music, and other arts.'); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219
("Indeed, copyright's purpose is toprommote the creation and publication of free expression .... '[Tlhe
Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of Free expression. By establishing a marketable
right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and
disseminate ideas.'" (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 557
(1985)).
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ('The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . ..
9 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
"0Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, 17 U.S.C. § 106, 114-115

(2000).
11Id
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(DRM). 2 It also provided a safe harbor for internet service providers who block
13
access to infringing material on their sites.
Although the Act itself has dual goals, the philosophies concerning these goals'
relation to each other have changed over time. Initially, the Act was meant to
balance artist compensation with public access to creative works. 4 Over the last
four decades, however, lawmakers have placed more emphasis on providing
incentives for artist creation and less emphasis on positive measures to ensure
public access.'" FMC recognizes that both artist compensation and public benefit
are important to maintaining a vibrant and sustainable cultural community. These
two aims are inextricably interwoven throughout copyright law. FMC believes
that in order for the emerging digital music marketplace to reach its potential,
current laws and policies must adjust to allow for digital businesses that achieve
both of these objectives to the fullest possible extent.
PART II
One key area that the new administration should evaluate is the current music
licensing system. Licensing reform would encourage a variety of legal options for
buying music and thus provide consumers with a broader array of viable,
attractive, and lawful alternatives to piracy. 6 The proliferation of blogs, social
networking sites, and other content-sharing platforms means that more people and
businesses are able to quickly reproduce, distribute, and publicly perform songs.
This ease of use, coupled with the difficulty of licensing works, also increases
potential liability for infringing activity. It is therefore necessary for rights holders
and music services to increase licensing efficiency in order to reduce the risk of
litigation, build a robust and competitive catalog of songs, and save business
resources from the countless complexities accompanying contemporary music
uses. Without a comprehendible, navigable, and streamlined licensing system, a
legitimate digital music marketplace may remain difficult to sustain and grow.

12 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as

amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
1317 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
14SeeJessica LItman, War Stories, 20 CARDozo ARTs & ENT L.J. 337, 342-46 (2002).
15 Id.
16

Reforming Section 115 ofthe CopyrightActforthe DgitalAge: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Courts,

the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. of the Judicaay, 11Oth Congress 1-2 (2007)
[hereinafter Peters Statement2007] (statement of Marybeth Peters, Registrar of Copyrights) ("If music
licensing reform is successful, consumers will be able to access more legal music online, through a
variety of competing services, and be less tempted by piratical services that today can already offer
every song ever written for free.").
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A. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF LICENSING

Copyright exists in a world of dualities. There are two separate copyrights
within each musical work: the sound recording copyright" and the musical
composition copyright. 8 Each type of copyright work is licensed separately
depending on whether it is being "publicly performed" (i.e., broadcast) or
reproduced and distributed." To further complicate matters, these two types of
copyrights operate differently in the terrestrial world versus the digital world. A
digital music service must obtain separate licenses depending on the means of
distribution it facilitates. There are two primary means of digital distribution:
"streaming" and "downloading." Each requires a different set of licenses.
However, these two distribution types can be further segmented into interactive
streaming, tethered downloads, and limited downloads. 20 It is sometimes unclear
what types of licenses digital music services need to have the proper permission
to distribute music via these methods.
Digital music services that offer music downloads or "DPDs"' must obtain
mechanical licenses from the musical composition copyright owner and master use
licenses from the sound recording copyright owner.' 2 A download is a complete
transfer of audio content from the internet onto a computer hard drive, where it
can then be listened to on demand.' It is the digital equivalent to buying a
physical recording, such as a CD, from a brick and mortar record store.

17

17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (2000).

18 Id § 102(a)(2).
1) A musical composition requires a public performance license for both terrestrial and digital

broadcast. It requires a mechanical license for physical and digital reproduction and distribution.
A sound recording requires a public performance license only for digital broadcast, and a master use
license for physical and digital reproduction and distribution. See Marcy Rauer Wagman & Rachel
Ellen Kopp, The DigitalRevolution Is Being Downloaded. Wby and How the CopyrightAct Must Change to
Accommodate an Ever Evolving Music Industy, 13 VILL.SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 271, 293 (2006) (showing
various rights associated with copyright).
' An interactive stream is a broadcast based on user-inputs or selected by the recipient. A
tethered download is a music download from a subscription that can only be played on an
authorized computer, while a limited download can only be played for a specific period of time. See
Skyla Mitchell, Note, Reforming Section 115: Escapefrom the Byrzantine World of MechanicalLicensing 24
CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1239, 1246 n.41 (2007).
21 A DPD or "digital phonorecord delivery" is the Copyright Act's term for a digital download
of a musical composition. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000).
' iTunes, however, does not pay mechanical licenses directly. Since iTunes acts like a retailer,
the record labels pay the mechanical royalties instead.
23 Cydney A. Tune, Copyrightson the Internet: A Sampleroflssues,in UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT
LAw 2008, at 281, 302 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Handbook Series
No. 938, 2008).
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Therefore, a digital download triggers the reproduction and distribution rights
granted to the copyright owner by the Copyright Act.
Section 115 of the Copyright Act provides a compulsory mechanical license for
the musical composition, i.e., it allows anyone to obtain permission to reproduce
and distribute "nondramatic musical works" so long as they abide by certain
requirements, most notably paying a royalty rate, set by law, to the composition's
owner.24 There is no compulsory license for sound recording copyrights. The
digital music service must negotiate with the sound recording copyright
owners-usually the record labels-individually.
Digital music services that provide broadcasts or "streams," such as
webcasters, must obtain public performance licenses from both the sound
recording copyright owner and the musical composition copyright owner. A
stream is a broadcast of music where no copy is made on the listener's hard
drive.2" A digital music service can obtain a blanket license from musical
composition copyright owners via various Performance Rights Organizations
(such as ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC). However, prior to 1995, only musical
composition copyright owners had the right to receive royalties for the public
performance of their works. Sound recording copyright owners obtained this
right from the Digital Performance Royalty in Sound Recordings Act of 1995
(DPRSRA).26 This right does not extend to terrestrial radio play-it only covers
digital public performances.2" As a result of this change in the law, digital music
services must also obtain blanket public performance licenses from sound
recording copyright owners via SoundExchange, a digital-only Performing Rights
Organization that exclusively collects and distributes digital performing rights
royalties to sound recording copyright owners and performers.28 Section 114 of
the Copyright Act outlines exemptions to the sound recording copyright owner's
exclusive public performance right.'
B. THE MAIN ISSUES

Although it is true that many current music services successfully offer music
downloads and streams, their future is far from certain. Many have reported
facing immense licensing difficulties. Moreover, there are many other music
services that have offered innovative, creative ways of listening to and enjoying

24 17

U.S.C. § 115; Mitchell, supra note 20, at 1241.

5 Tune, supra note 23, at 302.

2 Digital Performance Right in Sound Recording Act of 1995, 17 U.S.C. %§106, 114 (2000).
27 17 U.S.C. % 106,114.
2 SoundExchange, http://www.soundexchange.com (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
2 17 U.S.C. § 114.
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music, but have been driven out of business partly or entirely due to licensing
difficulties. A major stumbling block to business model innovation is the
transaction costs associated with the current licensing system for musical works
and sound recordings.
Rhapsody is one of the more successful online music subscription services.
Rhapsody offers its users interactive and non-interactive streaming of millions of
licensed songs, as well as tethered and permanent downloading options.30 While
this means that Rhapsody subscribers are presented with an array of options as to
how to interact with the songs, it did require Rhapsody to obtain virtually every
type of license for each song. Rhapsody creates multi-column spreadsheets for
every album, with each column denoting whether permission has been granted for
each use for both the sound recording copyright and the musical composition
copyright, as well as the licenses' territorial restrictions. 3 Although much of their
catalog was acquired through bulk licensing deals with major labels, songs can be
taken down at any time if rights holders have contract and licensing disputes."
Moreover, Rhapsody had to negotiate the publisher's royalty for digital downloads
for eight years before they could agree on a rate.33 During that time, they kept
millions of dollars in escrow until an agreement could be reached.'
This
demonstrates the tremendous amount of effort required in order to acquire and
sell content.
Rhapsody has managed to stay in business, but other sites were not as
fortunate. SpiralFrog, an ad-based music service, shut down in 2009. Although
DRM restrictions and a shrinking ad market were clearly contributing factors,
SpiralFrog's failure was also due to an inability to license an attractive catalog
quickly enough to become competitive.35 Licensing difficulties also plague
Pandora, another ad-based streaming music site. The last few years have been
spent waging a battle with the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB), the entity that sets
rates for compulsory mechanical licenses, over the royalty rate for webcasters.
The rates CRB initially set were extraordinarily prohibitive, so Pandora advocated
for a rate structure that could allow it to continue its business.36 Additionally,

o See Mitchell, supra note 20, at 302.
3 Kristin Thomson, Education Director, Future of Music Coalition, Presentation at Drexel
University: Great Ideas in Music Distribution . . . and the Laws that Make Their Existence
Untenable or Illegal (May 5, 2009) (transcript on file with author).
32 Id

34id
" Greg Sandoval, RequiemforaFrog: SpiralFrogShuts Down, CNET NEWS, Mar. 19,2009, http://
news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10200722-93.html.
6 See Eliot Van Buskirk, Royaly Hike Panics Webeasters,WIRED MAG., Mar. 06, 2007, availabkat
http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2007/03/72879.
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Pandora had to block overseas access in 2007 due to the lack of blanket licensing
structures in foreign countries, although this is an international issue outside the
scope of this Article.37 Despite Pandora's growing popularity, it has struggled to
stay afloat.38
Muxtape presents another interesting case. The service, which launched
in 2008, allowed fans to upload songs from their personal collections to create
digital "mixtapes" to share with other users. Muxtape quickly became a music fan
favorite, but was forced to shut down later that year after major labels threatened
the developer, Justin Ouellette, with copyright infringement lawsuits.39 Ouellette
did not have enough funds to pay the legal fees it would cost to fight the suits. He
entered into licensing negotiations with major labels, but eventually "walked away"
because the negotiations were too prohibitive and complicated.' In an open letter
posted on the Muxtape site, Ouellette explains why the service had to shut down:
"[The licensing negotiations] had become too complex for a site founded on
simplicity, too restrictive and hostile to continue to innovate the way I wanted
to."41 Muxtape has since relaunched with a vastly different business model. It
lacks the expansive catalog it had hoped to amass, a goal that had initially led
Ouellette to attempt licensing negotiations in the first place. 2
Digital start-ups face significant hurdles to obtaining licenses. The time and
resources necessary to negotiate and obtain licenses are prohibitive, yet licensing
is the key to avoiding legal liability. Administrative difficulties often deter many
businesses from licensing works, as was the case with Muxtape. Moreover, as we
discuss below, the lack of clarity as to what rights are implicated and what licenses
are needed as technologists innovate new ways of reproducing, distributing, and
performing music adds to the transactional cost of licensing negotiations.
Furthermore, the sustainability of digital music services can also be affected by

" Posting of Tim Westergren to Pandora Radio Blog, http://blog.pandora.com/pandora/ar
chives/2007/05/breaking-pandor.html (May 3, 2009, 21:16 EST) ("It's hard to think of anything
more anathema to who we are than turning off someone's radio, but the current legal realities leave
us no choice. While the DMCA provides us a blanket license in the U.S., there is no equivalent in
other countries.").
3 See Claire Cain Miller, Even if
Royaiesfor Web Radio Fall,Revenue Remains Elusive, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 2008, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/27/technology/intemet/27ra
dio.html?pagewanted=l&sq=pandora%20profit&st=Search&scp=l.
39 Muxtape, http://www.muxtape.com/story (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).

0 Id

41 Id
42

See id.
("I had to make a decision. As I saw it I had three options. The first was to just shut

everything down, which I never really considered. The second was to ban major label content
entirely, which might have solved the immediate crisis, but had two strong points against it. The
first, most visibly, was that it would prevent people from using the majority of available music in

their mixes.'.
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excessive royalty rates. FMC wants to ensure that musicians, songwriters, and
record labels are fairly compensated, yet complications in the rate setting process
often arise.
C. TRANSACTIONAL COSTS

The time and effort it takes to find a copyright owner, negotiate a licensing
agreement and rate, and establish what type of license is needed, often deters many
people from starting digital music businesses, or leads them to run these
businesses illegally. In either case, musicians and rights holders are not
compensated. Although there are many different complexities associated with the
problem of licensing transaction costs, this paper focuses on two issues:
reforming section 115 of the Copyright Act43 and determining which music
services implicate which rights.
1. Secfion 115. Section 115 provides a compulsory mechanical license for the
reproduction and distribution of copyrighted songs, thus eliminating the need to
negotiate royalty rates with the owners of each individual song. However, unlike
obtaining public performance licenses, there is no way to obtain a blanket
mechanical license for the rights to multiple songs. Although this license is
compulsory, digital businesses must provide notice of their intent to license to
each individual copyright owner or their rights agency. The Harry Fox Agency is
the organization that administers mechanical licenses, but 40% of rights holders
are not registered with them, including many popular music songwriters. 4
Copyright owners rarely use the compulsory mechanical license because of the
administrative red tape, instead preferring to directly license the work. 41 This
means that digital start-ups must individually contact many rights holders to secure
licenses. Moreover, obtaining a compulsory mechanical license requires the
licensee to fill out multiple-page forms for each song.' This requirement is not
feasible for a business which, in order to be competitive, must license hundreds
of thousands, even millions, of songs before opening its virtual doors.
Section 115 acts mainly as a price ceiling, effectively setting the statutory licensing
rate, but still has failed to eliminate significant transaction costs. 4 Virtually all

43 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000).

4 Les Watkins, Editorial, IndiesNeed Oplions Under Compulsory License Reform, BILLBOARD MAG.,
Mar. 26, 2005, at 10.
45 DONALD PASSMAN, EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MusIc BusINESs 204

(6th ed., Free Press 2006).
4 Section 115 of the CopynghtA ct. In Need of Update?.: Heatng bfore the Subcomm. on Courts,the Internet,
and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiday, 107th Congress 4-5 (2004) [hereinafter Potted
(testimony of Jonathan Potter, Executive Director, Digital Media Association).
' See i. ("Mhe 'statutory rate' is the benchmark for setting mechanical rates in the industry.");
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music industry groups agree that reforming section 115 is an essential step towards
mending the digital music licensing system.'
The current administrative
procedures for obtaining these licenses have been described as "so cumbersome
as to be dysfunctional."49
The Harry Fox Agency attempted to address this problem by creating a blanket
mechanical licensing system called Songfile. ° However, this service is only
available for those who want to make 2,500 copies or fewer. Considering the
international reach of the internet, one would imagine digital music services would
not favor restricting the amount of digital downloads offered., Additionally, this
blanket license is not technically a section 115 compulsory mechanical license.
Theoretically, one still has to negotiate the royalty rate for this license, although
in practice, the section 115 price ceiling artificially sets this rate at 9.1 cents per
song.
2. Which Rights Are Implicated? Even if the administrative procedures for
obtaining licenses were streamlined, it is often unclear what rights are implicated
by a particular digital use. Businesses are building new models that continue to
blur the line between mechanical distributions and performances, and further push
the possibilities of cloud-based music distribution. Take, for example, the
development of Twitter-based music streaming services. Twitter users can simply
type a song into a search bar on blip.fm, and if the song is hosted anywhere on the
internet, blip.fm generates a shortened URL link that allows the Twitter user to
share that song with his or her followers. Is this an infringing use? If so, who
would obtain the license, and how would performances be tracked?"1 Twitterbased music sharing is just one example of music distribution that doesn't fit
neatly into the existing music licensing structure.
There have also been arguments about the rights implicated by tethered
downloads, permanent downloads, interactive streaming, non-interactive
streaming, and ringtones. In 2008, Sony/ATV Publishing stopped all future
licensing of their repertoire for streaming or limited downloads in reaction to a
52
debate over whether an interactive stream should trigger a mechanical license.
This dispute affected the song catalog of sites like Rhapsody, which provides

see also Peters Statement 2007, supra note 16.
Peters Statement 2007, supra note 16, at 3.
9 Potter,supra note 46, at 7.

o The Harry Fox Agency, http://www.harryfox.com/public/licenseeServicesLimited.jsp (last
visited Sept. 22, 2009).
51 Twitter Me This, http: //futureofimusiccoation.blogspot.com/2009/05/twitter-me-this.htm
(May 10, 2009, 19:23 EST).
52 Susan Butler, Soy/ATVStqps FutureLicensingofDi taServcesBILLBARD MAG. Jan.08,208,
avaiiab/athttp://www.bilboard.biz/bbbiz/content-display/industry/e3i2e6366cOOOc69O5l69
36f62dee.
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interactive streaming services. Moreover, it is often difficult to determine whether
or not a digital broadcast is interactive. Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit issued an opinion suggesting that the ability to choose or
predict ipecific songs on a playlist may contribute to a finding that the service is
interactive. 3 Underlying this holding was consideration of the extent to which the
service "provides a service so specially created for the user that the user ceases to
purchase music."'
Additionally, there have been legal disputes about whether buffer copies of a
song invoke a performance or a mechanical right. Digital music services offering
streaming must make "buffer copies"5 5 or "ephemeral copies" 6 of the song on
their hard drives. These copies are destroyed after a fraction of a second and are
only used to facilitate the creation of the stream transmission. In the recent past,
copyright owners have insisted that these transitory copies constitute a
reproduction, and thus require mechanical royalties. Similarly, publishers have
argued that every online transmission of a musical work constitutes a public
performance, even if the work was downloaded instead of streamed. These
contentions-which have thus far been largely unsuccessful-constitute what
some call "double dipping," as copyright owners seek to receive both mechanical
and public performance royalties for a single digital broadcast or download of
their work."7 Recent court cases have established some rights implication
guidelines, but new technologies often are developed faster than the courts can
adapt.
In 2007, the judiciary provided much-needed clarification about the licenses
required for digital broadcasts. During rate-setting negotiations for digital
licensing, various digital music services and ASCAP asked the District Court for
the Southern District of New York to issue an opinion on whether digital
downloads are public performances. The resulting decision in United States v.
ASCAP held that a stream of a musical work constituted a public performance,
while a download of the work did not. 8 However, ASCAP has recently

" See Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 578 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2009).
'4 Id. at 164.
5' Posting of Sherwin Siy to Public Knowledge, http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/1700
(Aug. 7, 2008, 18:15 EST) ("A buffer copy is a copy that is made in the course of digital transfer.
It's not intended to be directly viewed, accessed, or used by anyone. It's just a step in the relay of
information from one source to another.").

s6 17 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
Music Licensing Reform: Hearing BSfore the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property
of the H. Comm. on the Judica, 109th Congress (2005) (Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of

Copyrights).

58 United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438,442
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("Although, as Applicants concede, the streaming of a musical work does
constitute a public performance, we conclude that the downloading of a digital music file, in and
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challenged that ruling's application to ringtones. ASCAP claims that ringtone
downloads are capable of "streaming or pseudo-streaming" and thus require an
ASCAP license. 9 The U.S. Copyright Office, however, ruled in 2006 that a
ringtone was a "digital phonorecord delivery"--essentially, a download-and was
subject to section 115 licensing.6 The Southern District of New York rejected
ASCAP's claim and ruled that ringtone providers do not need public performance
licenses.61 However, there are suggestions that ASCAP will continue to seek a
broader definition of public performance rights in Congress."
Moreover, it remains unsettled whether ephemeral, server, and buffer copies
made to facilitate music streaming infringe on copyright owners' reproduction and
distribution rights. Courts were forced to deal with this issue in 2008 when
London-Sire Records v. Doe addressed the definition of "fixation" as it refers to
phonorecords or copies triggering the distribution right.63 The court held that an
electronic transmission that "permits the work to be perceived ...or to be
reproduced, or to be further communicated, for a period of more than transitory
duration," is sufficiently 'fixed' to be considered a copy implicating the
distribution right.' 4 This definition, however, failed to settle the debate over
whether buffer copies trigger the distribution right. In Cartoon Network v. CSC
Holdings, Inc. the Second Circuit also tackled the issue of "fixation" as it applies to
buffer data.65 At issue was Cablevision's remote DVR, which allow cable
subscribers to record programs and store the recordings on a central hard drive
on Cablevision's property. The court established a two-prong test to evaluate

of itself, does not.").
" ASCAP's Opposition to AT&T's Motion For SummaryJudgment Concerning Ringtones at 1,
United States v. ASCAP, No. 41-1395 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
0 The Register of Copyrights ruled that master use ringtones were subject to section 115, while
ringtones that have been added to may be considered derivative works, and therefore outside the
scope of section 115 license. E.g., In reMech. & Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment,
Docket No. RF 2006-1 (Copyright Office Oct. 16, 2008).
61 In reCellco Partnership, Nos. 09 Civ. 7074(DLC)(MHD), 41 Civ. 1395(DLC), 2009 WL
3294861 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2009).
62 See Marcus Webb, PROsAsk Congress To ExpandMusic Pubhic Performance' Rights And Fees,
VENDING TIMES, 22 Oct. 2009, availabkathttp://www.vendingtimes.com/ME2/dirmod.asp?sid=

EB79A487112B48A296B38C81345C8C7F&nm=Vending+Features&type=Publishing&mod=Pu
blications%3A%3AArticle&mid=8F3A7027421841978F18BE895F87F791&tier=4&id=454B5586
8112438AA28A196F2D8E462E (describing letter from PROs to Rep. John Conyers (D-Mi),

chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, arguing for an expansion of the definition of public
performance).
63 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008).
"Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent Developments in US Copyngbt Law - PartII, Caselaw: Exclusive Rights
on the Ebb? 6 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, 2008), available
at http://sr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
1050&context=columbiapllt.
65 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
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fixation consisting of the "embodiment requirement" and the "duration
requirement."'' " The buffer copies Cablevision made met the embodiment
requirement, but failed to meet the duration requirement, and thus were not
sufficiently "fixed" to implicate the distribution right. However, the court did not
clarify what length of time would meet the duration requirement, restricting their
duration analysis to the facts at hand and stating, "our inquiry is necessarily factspecific, and other factors not present here may alter the duration analysis
significantly."67 While the case does provide some clarification, it would do much
to facilitate technological innovation if the requirements for the embodiment and
duration requirement were more clearly articulated. That way, new digital
businesses would have more guidance in creating legal distribution models.
The enormous amount of time and money digital music start-ups must invest
to properly license musical content is burdensome and suppresses the digital music
industry's growth. FMC recommends that Congress and the new administration
address these issues. Simplifying the licensing system by reducing transaction costs
and clarifying what licenses are required for music transmissions would reduce
initial overhead and allow innovators to lawfully enter into the digital music
marketplace and either rise or fall on their own merits.
D. LICENSING FEES

Even after securing copyright owners' permission, the licensing fees sometimes
prove to be so prohibitive that online music distributors cannot raise enough
revenue to pay them.6" While FMC wants to ensure that all content owners and
songwriters are fairly compensated for their work, FMC recognizes that many
digital businesses find it difficult to pay for content, particularly when copyright
holders request egregious licensing fees.
Perhaps the most recent example was the rate battle between webcasters and
the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB). The CRB sets rates for digital performance
royalties for webcasters. In 2007, the CRB increased public performance royalty

" See id. at 127 ('We believe that this language plainly imposes two distinct but related
requirements: the work must be embodied in a medium, i.e., placed in a medium such that it can
be perceived, reproduced, etc., from that medium (the 'embodiment requirement'), and it must
remain thus embodied 'for a period of more than transitory duration' (the 'duration requirement')").
67 Id at 130.
6' Antony Bruno, DigitalEntertainment: Profits From Profiks, BILLBOARD MAG., Dec. 15, 2007,
at 14 ("While popular services like Last.fm and Imeem have managed to strike deals with record
labels allowing such sites to stream copyrighted music in full in return for a share of advertising
revenue, not all music-based social networks find this an attractive model. For most, it's just too
expensive.').
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rates for streaming radio stations. 9 The new rates were mainly based on a perperformance structure, and would equate to 100% of webcasters income in some
cases.7' After a massive outcry from webcasters (most notably Pandora)71 claiming
that these new rates, in some cases, exceeded their entire incomes, Congress
passed the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008.72 That legislation would vacate the
CRB's decision if webcasters and copyright holders could agree on a royalty rate
by February 2009. The two sides failed to reach an agreement, but the Act was
extended on July 1, 2009. 7" Six days later, SoundExchange, the collection agency
for digital public performance royalties, reached a settlement with so-called "pureplay" webcasters-those entities whose entire online business models are built on
the digital broadcast of music content. 74 Large webcasters with significant
advertising revenue will pay the greater of 25% of their revenue or a per-song rate,
while smaller webcasters whose advertising revenue is less than $1.25 million per
year pay royalties amounting to 12% to 14% of their revenue.75 Although an
agreement was finally reached, it took years to accomplish, and its suitability has
yet to be determined.
On the mechanical composition side, in 1998, the Copyright Royalty Board
(CRB) increased the mechanical royalty rate for both physical music sales and
digital phonorecords to 9.1 cents per song.76 However, various trade associations

69 See Susan Butler, Inside the Webcast Outcy: What Will the CRB Hike Real Mean?, BILLBOARD
MAG., Mar. 24, 2007, at 22; Rory Cellan-Jones, Royalties Threaten Internet Radio, BBC WORLD NEWS,

Mar. 8, 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6430489.stm; Thomas Claburn,
InternetRadio ObservesDay of Silent Protest,INFORMATIONWEEK, June 26,2007, http://www.informa
tionweek.com/news/intemet/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=200000798; Future ofMusic Coalition,
FMCStatementonWebcastin~gRoyaly Rates, Mar. 17,2007, http://futureofmusic.org/press/press-relea
ses/fmc-statement-crb-webcasting-rates.
70 The rate increases applied retroactively, and increase the price per performance
from $0.0008
in 2006 to $0.0019 in 2010. This increase could equate to 100% of total revenue in some cases. See
Daniel McSwane, Webcast Royaly Rate Decision Announced, RAIN, Mar. 2, 2007, http://www.
kurthanson.com/archive/news/030207/index.shtml.
71 Pandora allows users to customize their own streaming radio stations, effectively generating
endless simultaneous performances that would trigger royalty payments.
72 Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-435,122 Stat. 4974 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
73 Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-36, 123 Stat. 1926 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
7 Claire Cain Miller, Music Labels Reach Online Rayalv Deal, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009, at B2,
avaiableathttp://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/08/technology/internet/08radio.html?_r= 1&partn
er=rss&emc=rss.
75 Id.at 10; Agreement Reached on Webcasting Royalty Rates, http://futureofinusiccoalition.
blogspot.com/2009/07/breaking-agreement-reached-on.html (July 7, 2009, 14:31 EST).
76 In reMech. & Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment, Docket No. RF2006-1
(Copyright Office Oct. 16, 2008), C.F.R. § 255 (1998).
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for songwriters were unhappy that the rate for permanent downloads' had been
set so low, and argued that the rate should be as high as 15 cents per song.78
Furthermore, stakeholders had difficulty agreeing on a rate for limited digital
downloads.79 It took close to a decade for music publishers, songwriters, digital
subscription services, and record labels to come to an agreement approved by the
CRB. 8° This significantly delayed artist compensation since digital music services
had to keep royalty payments in escrow until a rate could be decided.
Legal music services are always competing with the specter of "free." When
Rhapsody, an online music service, experimented by offering song downloads for
$0.49 instead of $0.99, their sales jumped six fold, which has led some to suggest
cheaper is better."' Even cheaper than "cheaper," Wired magazine editor Chris
Anderson, contends that content-based businesses should not charge for their
product at all.82 However, no business model has yet profited by giving away free
music. In fact, major labels recently have had to cut their licensing fees in order
to accommodate iMeem and other digital distribution services that could not
afford to pay the licensing fees, despite the decreasing costs of overhead and
production.8 3 Even though pricing disagreements may fuel arguments over ratesetting, it would benefit emerging businesses enormously to have a stable,
predictable licensing scheme that makes it easy to anticipate licensing costs and
obtain licenses.
Rate-setting is clearly a complicated economic practice, especially in an industry
with so many stakeholders. These stakeholders often expect a piece of the digital
revenue pie equivalent to, or greater than, what they had been receiving in the
physical realm. It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that nascent business
models cannot succeed if copyright holders demand exorbitant licensing rates.
Asking for high rates up front can frustrate the ultimate goal-the development

'1 "Permanent downloads" is used interchangeably with "digital phonorecord deliveries" for

the purposes of this Article.
11, 2008, at 13.
7 A limited digital download exists in subscription services like Rhapsody that allow you to
download songs as long as you pay a subscription fee. Once you stop paying the fee, you no longer
have access to the download. Limited digital downloads are also called "tethered" digital
78 Paul Williams, Royaly Rates Ruk'ng Reaps Rewards, MUSIC WK. MAG., Oct.

downloads.
' The rate was finally set at 10.5% of service revenue. Williams supra note 78, at 11; Agreement
Royale, http://futureofinusiccoalition.blogspot.com/2008/ 10/agreement-royale.html (Oct. 1, 2008,
14:47 EST).
8' Steven Levy, How Much is Music Worth?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 29, 2007, at 20; Zac Locke, How
To Save the Recording Industry?. CbargeLess, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 79 (2009).
82 E.g., CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE: THE FUTURE OF A RADICAL PRICE (2009).
s' Brad Stone, Music Labels Cut FiendlerDeals With Start-Ups,N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009, at B1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/28/technology/start-ups/28music.html.
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of a robust and legitimate digital marketplace that can properly compensate
stakeholders, including artists.
PART III
Another key area deserving of Congress's and the administration's attention
is network neutrality. The internet is often thought of as an ephemeral, noncorporeal reality, but it actually operates via a large and complicated physical
infrastructure. Although clearly more complex than a "series of tubes,"' the
internet is essentially delivered through cables designed to carry a certain amount
of bandwidth. Large telecommunications companies claim that if too much
information is pushed through these cables, the network can become congested
and internet connectivity can be compromised. Rather than invest in better lastmile and middle-mile connections," these companies would prefer to charge
content providers a fee for faster delivery of their sites and services and engage in
"deep packet inspection" and other network management practices to target and
delay the transfer of high-bandwidth content like videos and music. This type of
network management has already taken place in some instances. 86
Network neutrality---or "net neutrality" as it is commonly known-is the
principle that preserves the internet's open protocol foundation.8" It guarantees
that all users can access the content and run the applications or devices of their

8' MP3 Recording: Hearing on S. 2686 Communications, Consumers' Choice, and Broadband
Deployment Act of 2006 Before the S. Commerce Comm. (June 8,2006), http://media.publicknow
ledge.org/stevens-on-nn.mp3 (Senator Ted Stevens famously called the internet a "series of
tubes.").
" Network infrastructure is divided into four categories: backbone, middle mile, last mile and
last 100 feet. Backbone consists of underground fiber optic cables, satellite systems or radio
spectrum that handle high-speed transmission of high-content data. Middle mile and last mile are
the two intermediate sections of the network. The middle mile usually consists of fiber optic cable,
while the last mile is either a digital modem facility, DSL facility, satellite facility, or terrestrial
wireless facility. The last mile connects the middle mile to the last 100 feet leading to the end-user's
terminal. Inquiy Concerning the Deployment ofAdvanced Telecommunications Capabihy to AllAmenicans in
a Reasonable and Time# Fashionand Possible Stps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuantto Section 706 of
the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996, CC Docket No. 98-146, Second Report, 15 F.C.C. Rcd 20913,
20922-23 (2000) (Second Report); see also Myles Roberts, Note, Opening the Last Mile to Competition,
4 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 309 (2005).
' Matthew Lasar, Comcast, Net Neutraiv Advocates Clash at FCC Hearing, ARS TECHNICA,
Feb. 25, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/02/comcast-and-net-neutrality-advoca
tes-clash-at-fcc-heaing.ars (stating that Comcast has admitted to managing content traffic by
delaying P2P uploads).
87 Tim Wu, Nework Neutraio,BroadbandDiscimination,2J. TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141,141
(2003) (coining the phrase "network neutrality"); Rock the Net, http://www.futureofinusic.org/issu
es/campaigns/rock-net (last visited Sept. 22, 2009).
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choice. Net neutrality prevents large telecommunications companies from giving
preferential treatment to wealthier content providers who can afford to pay for
faster delivery of their sites and services. It also precludes ISPs from blocking
access to certain sites, either for political reasons or because they are owned by
competitors.
Net neutrality is essential for new business growth and innovation. It allows
small businesses and local organizations to operate on the same technological
playing field as the largest national and international companies. Unequal access
to the internet could severely undermine economic development, particularly in
the nascent digital music marketplace. FMC recognizes that there are other
barriers to digital innovation on the internet, but the presence of other issues does
not diminish the importance of enacting enforceable net neutrality principles that
clearly outline standards of conduct for all market participants.
A. HISTORY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INTERNET REGULATION

The telecommunications industry has historically been regulated by the
principle of "common carriage,""8 which prevents discriminatory service and
compels telecommunications companies to allow other carriers to use their lines. 9
A common carrier-a company subject to common carriage regulations-cannot
evaluate the content received from its customers or treat customers differently. 9°
They must provide their users equal access to their service. 9 Common carriage
was originally imposed on the railroad industry,92 and its application to
telecommunications was first codified in the Communications Act of 1934.93
Common carriage, however, does not apply to cable and broadband internet
companies. 94 In 2005, the Supreme Court's Brand X decision (announced the

' Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 153(10) ("The term 'common carrier' or 'carrier'
means any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by
wire or radio or interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy, except where reference is made
to common carriers not subject to this chapter; but a person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not,
insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.'.
89 Sascha D. Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard, The New Network Neutralt: Cteria ForInternet
Freedom, 12 INT'LJ. CoMM. L. & POL'Y 225, 227 (2008).
o Kevin Werbach, On# Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1246 (2007).
91 Jim Rossi, The Common Law 'Duo To Serve" and Protection of Consumers in an Age of Copetitive
RetailPubic Utilit Restructuting, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1233, 1248 (1998).
' Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 49 Cong. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended at 49

U.S.C.).

93 Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, 47 U.S.C.A. § 151
(2001).
94 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Intemet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 973 (2005)
(holding that the Federal Communication Commission's classification of broadband as an
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same day as MGM v. Grokste)9 upheld the FCC's classification of cable
96
broadband as an "information service," not a "telecommunications service.,
This decision is more than mere semantics-the "information service"
classification exempted cable and broadband internet companies from common
carrier regulation.9
Since BrandXdefined the internet as an information service, common carriage
principles cannot be applied to achieve non-discrimination over the internet. Net
neutrality principles are a viable alternative to gain non-discrimination regulation,
and it has significant support in the FCC. In 2004, former FCC Chairman Michael
Powell articulated four necessary internet freedoms: (1) the freedom to access
content, (2) the freedom to run applications, (3) the freedom to attach devices, and
(4) the freedom to obtain service plan information.9" These four principles have
come to define net neutrality's core doctrine. The four principles were
subsequently reinterpreted by FCC Chairman Kevin Martin, who modified the
principles to read:
(1) consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of
their choice; (2) consumers are entitled to run applications and
services of their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement; (3)
consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that
do not harm the network; and (4) consumers are entitled to
competition among network providers, application and service
providers, and content providers.99
However, Martin also added that "[all of these principles are subject to reasonable
network management,"''1 which alters the net neutrality framework. By
supporting only devices that "do not harm the network" and endorsing

"information service" was reasonable under a Chevron analysis).
9' Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005) (holding that
fie-sharing sites could be found, to have violated the Copyright Act by intentionally inducing
copyright infringement).
96 BrandX, 545 U.S. at 967.
97 Id.

98 See Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks at the Silicon Flatirons
Symposium on The Digital Broadband Migration: Toward a Regulatory Regime for the Internet
Age (Feb. 8, 2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-24355
6A1 .pdf; Frederick W. Pfister, Net Neutra/y:An InternationalPo'f-forthe UnitedStates, 9 SAN DIEGO
INT'L L.J.

167, 181 (2007).

9 See Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Adopts Policy Statement: New Principles
Preserve and Promote the Open and Interconnected Nature of Public Internet (Aug. 5, 2005),
availableat http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-260435Al.pdf.
100 Id.
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"reasonable network management," Martin left the door open for
telecommunications companies to discriminate in the name of traffic management.
This leaves private citizens and public interest groups to produce evidence of
possible violations, which the FCC can choose to investigate through lengthy
hearing processes.
Neither Martin's nor Powell's "four freedoms" framework, however, has
regulatory authority. Although, the FCC has begun rulemaking proceedings, no
official regulations have been passed,'' nor has Congress passed any enforceable
legislation that would regulate cable and internet companies according to net
neutrality principles. °2 Telecommunications companies are theoretically able to
manage their networks by creating a tiered system of content delivery or by
blocking or delaying content transfers. °3 What does this mean for music?
B. NETWORK MANAGEMENT

Without government oversight, cable and internet companies could carve up
the internet into fast and slow lanes with those content providers who are able (or
willing) to pay an ISP toll receiving preferential service. In such a scenario, labels,
independent musicians, and technological innovators may have difficulty achieving
a competitive presence in a legitimate digital music marketplace. The internet
allows both the smallest independent label and the largest international media
company to compete on a technological playing field. Without enforceable net
neutrality principles, telecommunications and cable companies could discriminate
against content providers-particularly those who deliver products or services that
compete with the ISP's own offerings.
One method of discrimination is access tiering. Access tiering is the practice
of selling preferential content delivery rates to those who can afford to pay for
it."° Currently the internet operates on a "best efforts" delivery system, meaning
that packets of information are delivered on a first-come, first-serve basis, with no

101In the Matter of Preseringthe Open Internet, GN

Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52,

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, F.C.C. 09-93 (2009), availableat http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs
_public/attachmatch/FCC-09-93Al.pdf.
102 Legislation has been introduced, but has not passed. See, e.g., Internet Freedom Preservation
Act, S. 215, 110th Cong. § 12(a)(4)(C), (5) (2007); H.R. 5273, 109th Cong. § 4(a)(6), (7) (2006);
H.R. 5417, 109th Cong. § 3 (2006).
103 However, the Comcast decision and Internet Policy Statement may provide some regulation.
104 Lawrence Lessing & Robert W. McChesney, No Tollon the Internet,WASH. PoST,June 8,2006,
at A23 ('The current legislation, backed by companies such as AT&T, Verizon and Comcast, would
allow the firms to create different tiers of online service."); see also Tim Wu & Christopher Yoo,
Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and ChristopherYoo Debate,59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575, 578 (2007).
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guarantee that they will actually arrive at their destinations.' 5 All packets are
indiscriminately subject to this delivery system. Access tiering would modify this
process and allow telecommunications companies to prioritize some content over
others, generally giving preference to content provided by sites that pay for faster
delivery speeds.
Some point out that a complete restriction on content discrimination would
prevent ISPs from giving time-sensitive services, like VoIP, video, and streaming
music, priority over non-time-sensitive services like email.0 6 However, nondiscrimination principles are needed to prevent discrimination between these timesensitive services. Content delivery discrimination could severely undermine
economic innovation, especially in the digital music distribution market. Tim Wu,
one of the leading experts on net neutrality, asserts that access tiering distorts
competition and makes market entry difficult for companies other than nonthreatening business models associated with the ISPs.107 Net neutrality would
allow innovative and unaffiliated digital businesses to attempt economic success
on the web.
ISPs also have the ability to manage the content on their networks through
various packet inspection procedures. "Deep Packet Inspection," or DPI, allows
ISPs to inspect the content of messages in transit over the web and then choose
to block or delay them, depending on the packet's content or origin.0 8 Other ISPs
send forged RST packets into the network that instruct connections, such as P2P
transfers, to terminate. This is the method Comcast used in 2007 to throttle
BitTorrent traffic. 9
In the summer of 2008, the FCC ordered Comcast, one of the few
telecommunications giants that control the public's access to the internet, to stop
interfering with its customers P2P transfers, specifically those that use BitTorrent
protocol."0 In its order, the FCC noted that an Associated Press report had found

105Wu & Yoo, supra note 104, at 579.
"0Jonathan Nuechterlein, Antitrust Oversight of an Antitrust Dispute: An InstitutionalPerspectiveon
the Net Neutrakl Debate, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 19, 32 (2009) ("If taken seriously,
[complete nondiscrimination between content] would thus preclude a broadband provider from
giving any priority to real-time applications that need such priority in order to function properly (such
as voice and video) over other applications that have no similar need.").
107 Wu & Yoo, supra note 104, at 582.
108M. Chris Riley & Ben Scott, Deep Packet Inspection: The Endofthe InternetAs We Know It?, FREE
PRESs, Mar. 2009, at 3, avai/abk at http://www.freepress.net/files/DeepPacketInspectionThe
_End of theInternetAsWe.KnowIt.pdf.
109 BitTorrent is an intemet protocol used by various companies to distribute legal video. P2P
services also use it to illegally distribute music over the internet. See Complaint at 2-3, Free Press
and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp., 23 F.C.C.R. 13028 (2008) (No. 07-52) [hereinafter
FCC Comcast Order].
110 FCC Comcast Order at 4.
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that "Comcast's interference affects all types of content, meaning that, for
instance, an independent movie producer who wanted to distribute his work using
BitTorrent and his Comcast connection could find that difficult or impossible..'
Comcast apparently throttled this traffic because BitTorrent's video transfers
competed with Comcast's Video On Demand service," 2 but at an FCC hearing on
net neutrality, Comcast claimed their activities were mere "network
management.. '" 3 However, the FCC found that Comcast specifically targeted and
interfered 14with BitTorrent users, regardless of the level of network congestion at
the time.
FMC believes net neutrality principles should be codified to promote entry into
the marketplace. Certain principles of openness and access are necessary to
encourage a thriving free market. Adopting net neutrality principles and clarifying
what ISP activities fall within the bounds of reasonable network management would
protect emerging digital music services, preserve the egalitarian nature of the
internet, and encourage competition in the digital realm.
FMC commends the FCC's recent initiative in creating net neutrality
regulations. On October 22, 2009, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking that announced the intention to codify the four net neutrality
principles announced in 2005."' The FCC proposes changing the language of the
four principles to more clearly and affirmatively impose an obligation on
broadband internet service providers in order to clarify who bears the
responsibility of adhering to these principles." 6 Moreover, the FCC proposed
these rules apply to providers of non-dial-up intemet services, including wireless
broadband." 7 Most notably, the FCC has proposed adding fifth and sixth
principles of nondiscrimination and transparency." 8
The fifth principle of nondiscrimination would prohibit broadband internet
providers from treating "lawful content, applications and services in a

...Peter Svensson, Comeast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, AP Testing Shows, ASSOCIATED

PRESS,

Oct. 19,2007, avaiblathttp://seattledmes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2003962029WebComcastl9.html.
112

FCC Comcast Order at 2.

113

Lasar, supra note 86, at 12.

114 See general# FCC Comcast Order.

11 In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, at 4, 37-41,
availabkathttp://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspubic/attachmatch/FCC-09-93A1 .pdf ("To guide this
process, [the FCC offers] draft rules, including a codification of the existing internet policy
principles, additional principles of nondiscrimination and transparency, an acknowledgement that
these principles apply to all forms of broadband Internet access, and a discussion of 'managed' or
'specialized' services.").
116 Id

at 37-38.

1" Id at 5, 38.
118

Id at 4, 41-48.
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nondiscriminatory manner."" 9 The nondiscrimination principle would not be an
extension of common carriage, but instead would be a "bright-line rule against
discrimination, subject to reasonable network management and enumerated
exceptions. '
The sixth principle of transparency requires these providers to "disclose such
information concerning network management and other practices as is reasonably
required for users and content, application, and service providers to enjoy the
protections specified in this rulemaking.' 12' Although not stated directly, it seems
that the lack of publicly disclosed network management practices during the
FCC's 2008 Comcast investigation partially motivated the sixth principle's
inclusion in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.1 2
FMC believes the FCC has taken an important step towards creating
enforceable net neutrality regulation. None of the principles have yet been
officially codified as of this Article's publication; however, FMC hopes that during
the rulemaking process, the FCC does not stray too far from preserving the
principles of openness and competition that seem to form the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking's foundation.
C. WHAT ABOUT FAIR USE?

Codifying net neutrality principles, however, may have unintended
consequences. Any type of legislation or FCC rulemaking would likely specify that
net neutrality principles only apply to legal content on the web, leaving room for
ISPs to block or delay illegal material such as child pornography and suspected
copyright infringement. During a recent Senate Commerce Committee FCC
nominations hearing, now-FCC Commissioner Meredith Atwell Baker stressed
that net neutrality should only apply to legal content, and that child pornography,
spam, and copyright infringement should not be protected by nondiscrimination
principles."2 Moreover, the FCC emphasized the distinction between legal and

119 Id. at

5. The proposed rule's language is: "Subject to reasonable network management, a

provider of broadband Internet access service must treat lawful content, applications, and services
in a nondiscriminatory manner." Id at 41.
'20 Id. at 43.
121 Id. at 5. The proposed rule's language is "Subject to reasonable network management, a
provider of broadband Internet access service must disclose such information concerning network
management and other practices as is reasonably required for users and content, application, and
service providers to enjoy the protections specified in this part." Id. at 45.
122 Id at 46-47. For more information regarding the FCC's 2008 Comcast investigation, see

supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
123 Shane Wagman, FCCNominationsHearing: Ju# 15, 2009, Future of Music Coalition, July 16,
2009, availabkat http://futureofmusic.org/article/article/fcc-nominations-heaing-july-15-2009.
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illegal content on the internet in their 2008 Comcast order. Although the FCC's
decision instructed Comcast to cease its anticompetitive network management
practices, the Commission simultaneously emphasized that anti-discrimination and
net neutrality principles only apply to legal content: "We ...note that because
'consumers are entitled to access the lanful internet content of their choice,'
providers, consistent with federal policy, may block transmissions of illegal
content (e.g., child pornography) or transmissions that violate copyright law."' 24
Most importantly, the FCC's recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for
codifying network neutrality principles specifically and unequivocally states that
network neutrality principles do not apply to the unlawful transfer of copyrighted
material.' The FCC, however, fails to address the fact that it is often extremely
difficult to evaluate whether or not a transmission is a copyright infringement. As
a result, the Commission's broad statement on network management may give
telecommunications companies the power to determine what is and is not fair use.
Fair use is a defense to copyright infringement and permits certain uses of a
copyrighted work without the owner's permission. 6 According to the U.S.
Copyright Office, "[t]he distinction between fair use and infringement may be
unclear and not easily defined."' 27 In general, reproducing or distributing a
copyrighted work for comment, criticism, education, scholarship, or news
reporting may be fair uses of the work. 2 ' FMC recognizes internet companies
have a legitimate interest in helping to prevent copyright infringement, but those
efforts should not stamp out fair use. This Article does not purport to delve into
the debate concerning fair use in general. Instead, FMC wants to highlight fair use
as a concern for policymakers tasked with regulating the internet.
Without recognizing that the line between legal and illegal uses is often blurred,
the government may inadvertently give telecommunications companies the power
to determine what is and is not fair use. Capricious and arbitrary ISP decisions

124FCC Comcast Order at 31.
"' In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, 4, 37, available
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/FCC-09-93Al.pdf

("Moreover, it is

important to emphasize that open Internet principles apply only to lawful transfers of content.

They do not, for example, apply to activities such as the unlawful distribution of copyrighted works,
which has adverse consequences on the economy and the overall broadband ecosystem. In order
for network openness obligations and appropriate enforcement of copyright laws to co-exist, it

appears treasonable for a broadband Internet access service provider to refuse to transmit
copyrighted material if the transfer of that material would violate applicable laws.").
126 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1163 (9th Cit. 2007) ('The fair use defense
permits the use of copyrighted works without the copyright owner's consent under certain

situations.').
12 U.S. Copyright Office, Fair Use, available at http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fll02.html

(last

visited Sept. 22, 2009).
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may unintentionally undermine the public's fair use rights."
telecommunications expert, writes,

Rob Frieden, a

Fair use in an offline environment involves empirical and value
judgments based on somewhat ambiguous criteria.... Empowering
hardware and software to establish and enforce a priori fair use
policies usurps decision making by individuals and vests it with an
intermediary that has every incentive to take the path of least
resistance and lowest cost ....
"'
Courts have held that copyright owners must consider fair use before sending
takedown notices to websites hosting music and other potentially infringing
content.'
The preference for considering fair use rights also should apply to
telecommunications companies that block potentially infringing music downloads
or streams. FMC continually advocates for legislation codifying network neutrality
principles, but we believe such legislation should try to avoid unintended
consequences. Recognizing potential concerns regarding fair use will hopefully
spur legisiators to tread carefully when drafting net neutrality legislation.
V. CONCLUSION

Despite possible pitfalls, the future of music is bright. The internet has
allowed unprecedented levels of access, exposure, and collaboration between
musicians and fans. Music has never been more in demand, and it has never been
easier for the public to experience art. However, we must be careful to foster this
fertile landscape, not stifle it. Copyright law and telecommunications policy
should be adjusted to make it easier for new, innovative digital start-ups to enter
the market and be competitive. At the same time, we must be careful these
adjustments take into account the public benefit of access to music and the need
for creators to be fairly compensated. FMC recommends two best practices for
policy makers to follow when tackling these issues.
First, it is vital to be fully informed as we move forward on policy initiatives.
Necessary data could include surveying artist revenue streams, comparing varying
royalty rates with music services' economic success, monitoring ISP network

129

Rob Frieden, InternetPacketSniffing and Its Impact on the Network Neutrak v Debate and the Balance

ofPowerBetweenIntellectualProperyCreatorsand Consumers, 18 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.

L.J. 633, 672-73 (2008).
'30 Id. at 673.
13 See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that

consideration of fair use is part of the initial review required by th DMCA before copyright owners
can send takedown notices to potential infringers).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2009

25

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 8

J. ThTELL PROP. L

[Vol. 17:95

management practices and their effects, if any, on small business market entry,
cataloging complaints regarding fair use and de minimis uses, and keeping track
of music distribution innovations which could implicate multiple rights.
Second, artists must be represented in policy debates and negotiations. Often,
the musician's voice gets lost among the opinions of record labels, trade groups,
policy makers, and technological innovators, and the musician's position can often
be different than the positions of other stakeholders. Those who create and
perform the music must be forefront in any discussion regarding artist
compensation and creating a legitimate digital music marketplace.
Ultimately, FMC advocates for clarity. The administrative process for licensing
must more clearly define what rights are implicated by new digital distribution
methods. The concept of net neutrality should be clarified to indicate what
behaviors fall within reasonablenetwork management practices, and what methods
we will use in the future to protect fair use rights. Additionally, the processes used
to reach these decisions should be inclusive, transparent, and accessible. The
music ecosystem is rapidly transforming-in many instances providing hints of
what sustainable models might look like. Yet some barriers stand in the way of
a legitimate digital music marketplace where creators and rights holders are
compensated, innovation can flourish, and public access to musical culture
remains viable. FMC is confident that the new administration and Congress can
address these barriers, while helping to identify mutually acceptable solutions,
provided all stakeholders have a voice in shaping the future.
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